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ABSTRACT
Financial analysts’ earnings forecasts are more consistent with stock recommendations
when their earnings forecasts are more accurate (Loh and Mian 2006, Ertimur et al. 2007). This
suggests that analysts use other information in their private valuation models in addition to
earnings forecasts especially when earnings have greater uncertainty. Recent studies show that
political connections are important for firm valuation and are associated with future positive
returns and future positive operating performance (Faccio 2006, Cooper et al. 2010). In this
study, I examine how a firm’s political connections affect stock recommendation
informativeness as well as the efficiency with which analysts translate their earnings forecasts
into stock recommendations. Using data from the Federal Election Commission through the
Center for Responsive Politics from 1993 – 2011, I first show that analysts’ recommendations
are less informative when firms have political connections. This relation holds for both All-Star
and non-All-Star analysts, upgrade and downgrade recommendations, as well as initiation and
non-initiation recommendations. Second. I show that analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy is less
consistent with recommendation informativeness when firms are politically connected. This
inconsistency appears to be driven by non-All-Star analysts, upgrade recommendations, and noninitiation recommendations. The findings of this study imply that political connection
information is one source of important nonfinancial disclosure that influences how analysts map
their earnings forecasts into stock recommendations.

vi

1.

INTRODUCTION

Studies show that financial analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations are
more consistent when their earnings forecasts are more accurate (Loh and Mian 2006, Ertimur et
al. 2007). This implies that analysts consider factors other than earnings forecasts in valuing a
firm especially when earnings have greater uncertainty. If earnings are less predictable or of
lower quality, analysts will use more idiosyncratic information as inputs into private valuation
models which in turn guide the stock recommendation. This suggests that when a factor is
consistent with more (less) certain information being provided through the recommendation,
there will be a positive (negative) relation between such a factor and recommendation
informativeness1. It follows that the association between recommendation informativeness and
forecast accuracy also depends on the certainty of the analysts’ earnings forecasts.
One important area where the certainty of earnings forecasts can be affected is the
existence of political connections. Recent work in the finance and economics literature
documents that political connections are value relevant and affect a firm’s future operating
performance (Faccio 2006, Goldman et al. 2009, Cooper et al. 2010). In addition, Chen et al.
(2010) find that financial analysts have worse forecast accuracy for politically connected firms.
These findings suggest that political connections affect both analysts’ earnings forecasts and
stock recommendations. Therefore, in this study, I first examine whether political connections
affect analysts’ stock recommendation informativeness. Second, I investigate whether political
connections affect the efficiency with which analysts translate their earnings forecasts into stock
recommendations. In essence, I seek to determine whether analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy is

1

In this study I use the term “ recommendation informativeness” instead of “recommendation profitability” to
emphasize that the main objective of this study is to test the overall information content of stock recommendations
for politically connected firms rather than exploiting a trading strategy aimed at generating abnormal returns.
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more or less consistent with stock recommendation informativeness when the firms they follow
have political connections.
Traditionally, the financial analyst literature has focused on either analysts’ earnings
forecast accuracy or stock recommendation informativeness independently from one another.
Schipper (1991) states that the process of forecasting earnings is one of many pieces of
information used to arrive at a stock recommendation. She argues that earnings forecasts are an
important input into the analysts’ final output (the stock recommendation) but are not the
ultimate end product. Since Schipper (1991), studies have begun to examine how analysts
actually use their earnings forecasts as inputs into generating stock recommendations. Loh and
Mian (2006) show that analysts who are more accurate have more informative recommendations.
Ertimur et al. (2007) show that this positive relation holds only when earnings are value relevant.
In essence, earnings forecasts are less likely to be an essential input into the analysts’ valuation
model if the earnings are not an important determinant of firm value. This signifies that greater
forecast accuracy is not always related to more informative recommendations. I contribute to this
line of literature by examining how political connections alter the mapping of analysts’ earnings
forecasts into stock recommendations.
Since information on political connectedness matters to the market for firm valuation
(Faccio 2006), it follows that analysts will incorporate this information into their private
estimates of a firm’s intrinsic value. Anecdotal evidence shows that analysts’ reports often
analyze the value of a firm’s political connections as well as how this value contributes to the
analysts’ stock recommendation. For example, analyst Jonathan Litt writes, “The Catellus
management team, and Mr. Rising in particular, have strong political connections and public
policy expertise. We believe this is an important attribute of the company, as land development
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projects often have community and city political hurdles to overcome.”2 Analysts typically
examine two facets of political connections: (1) whether the firm makes political contributions
and to whom the contributions are made, and (2) whether officers, large shareholders, or
members of the board of directors hold a top political position. Analysts are generally optimistic
in their reports about firms’ political connections, but they are also aware of the potential for
increased risk. For example, Kevin St. Pierre writes, “Vernon Hill announced in 2003 that
Commerce Bank would close down its political action committee amidst allegations that their
significant political contributions were influencing government business in banking, bond
underwriting, and insurance.” Therefore, it is clear from analyst reports that political connection
information affects both their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. This study takes a
more detailed look at how this information on political connectedness actually affects analysts’
two primary research outputs.
In this study, I use data on political contributions3 from the Federal Election Commission
(FEC) through the Center for Responsive Politics. This database contains detailed information on
the political candidates to whom firms contribute as well as the amounts contributed. Following
Cooper et al. (2010), I design four proxies for political connectedness based on the following: (1)
the number of supported candidates, (2) the number of supported, incumbent candidates
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Other examples from INVESTEXT analysts’ reports include: (1) “Freddie Mac’s Richard Syron has held executive
positions at the Federal Home Loan Bank, the Federal Reserve, and the American Stock Exchange. In addition to his
doctorate in economics, he is known to be politically adept - something the board was searching for.” – Jim
Callahan; (2) “Among ICx Technologies' board of directors are former Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham and
former Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater. The chairman of the board, Mark Mills, has done consulting to the
White House and has worked with some of the federal research laboratories. These high-level connections may
assist ICx in winning lucrative government contracts.” - Michael Pierson; (3) “The Shaw Group's experience in
restoration work along with its political contacts -CEO Bernhard was chairman of the Louisiana Democratic Party,
and a former governor of Louisiana sits on Shaw's board - should help the company continue to win work associated
with the Gulf Coast's restoration efforts.” - John Kearney; (4) “Citigroup's upper management and directors,
including Sandy Weill, Robert Willumstad, Charles Prince, and Robert Rubin, are well respected. Credibility and
political connections will be as important as Citigroup's core fundamentals in the months ahead.” - Craig Woker.
3
I use the terms political connections, political contributions, campaign contributions, and political donations
interchangeably throughout this study.
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weighted by the length of the firm-candidate relationship, (3) the number of supported,
incumbent candidates that hold office in the same state where the firm is headquartered, and (4)
the number of supported, incumbent candidates weighted the power of the candidate.
I first examine how a firm’s political connections affect analysts’ stock recommendation
informativeness. Political contributions are often characterized as long-term relationships
between the firm and the political candidate in the form of implicit long-term contracts (Snyder
1992). Many political candidates reward firms with political favors assuming they win office and
the opportunity to provide a favor arises. Therefore, because there are many elements of
unpredictability regarding if the politician will be able to help the firm as well as when the
potential favor will come to fruition, there is likely to be increased future earnings uncertainty.
Even if analysts are not able to predict the short-term effects of political connections through
earnings forecasts, the long-term horizon of stock recommendations should capture the impact of
the change in expected future cash flows. Therefore, if analysts are able to incorporate the
favorable (or unfavorable) effects of political connections into their stock recommendations,
analysts’ recommendations will be more informative for politically connected firms.
Alternatively, if analysts are unable to use other information to resolve uncertainty effectively,
analysts’ recommendations will be less informative.
Second, I examine how political connections affect the relation between forecast
accuracy and recommendation informativeness to shed light on how analysts actually use
political information. Financial analysts have greater difficulty predicting the earnings of firms
that have political connections (Chen et al. 2010). This is consistent with political favors
disrupting the future earnings stream process in an unpredictable manner. Therefore, it is likely
that due to the inherent uncertainty, analysts’ recommendations will rely less on earnings
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forecasts in their private valuation models. Accordingly, there will be less association between
recommendation informativeness and earnings forecast accuracy. On the other hand, it is
possible that analysts with more experience covering politically connected firms or analysts who
perform more private information search for these firms will have higher earnings forecast
accuracy. Therefore, these analysts will rely more on earnings forecasts in their private valuation
models. In this latter situation, there will be a greater association between recommendation
informativeness and earnings forecast accuracy.
I find that analysts’ stock recommendations are significantly less informative when the
firms they follow are politically connected. I find that this negative relation holds for both AllStar and non-All-Star analysts, upgrade and downgrade recommendations, as well as initiation
and non-initiation recommendations. I also show that analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy is less
consistent with stock recommendation informativeness for firms that have political connections.
However, the negative relation between earnings forecast accuracy and recommendation
informativeness for politically connected firms appears to be driven by non-All-Star analysts,
upgrade recommendations, and non-initiation recommendations.
This study contributes to two separate strands of the analyst forecast literature and also to
the political connections literature. First, I inform the literature that examines how analysts map
their earnings forecasts into stock recommendations by documenting another important factor
that influences this process. The evidence suggests that analysts rely less on earnings forecasts in
private valuation models used to generate stock recommendations when firms have political
connections. Second, I also contribute to the recent literature that examines how analysts use
information on nonfinancial disclosures in their earnings forecasts. There is only one published
study of which I am aware that examines how analysts’ use of nonfinancial information
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influences forecast error. Specifically, Dhaliwal et al. (2012) find that analysts have greater
forecast accuracy for firms that issue stand-alone corporate social responsibility reports. I
contribute to this line of literature by documenting another important source of nonfinancial
information, namely corporate political activity, which affects both analysts’ earnings forecasts
and stock recommendations. Third, I contribute to the political connections literature by showing
that financial analysts are one channel through which information on political connections affects
firm valuation. Many studies find that political connectedness is associated with an increase in
firm value (Faccio 2006, Faccio and Parley 2009, Cooper et al. 2010). I show that part of this
market reaction can be directly attributed to investors’ interpretation of analysts’ earnings
forecasts and stock recommendations for firms that have political connections.
Section 2 and Section 3 provide a review of the relevant literature and hypothesis
development. Section 4 and Section 5 consist of the measurement of political connections and
research design. Section 6, Section 7, and Section 8 present the sample selection, results, and
sensitivity analyses. Section 9 concludes the study.
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2.
2.1.

BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Mapping of Earnings Forecasts into Recommendations
Schipper (1991) motivated researchers to study analysts’ decision-making process in

more detail by examining how analysts’ earnings forecasts are used as inputs into analysts’
valuation models from which they calculate the intrinsic value of the firm and ultimately issue a
stock recommendation. Prior literature then began to assess the effectiveness of analysts in
transforming their earnings forecasts into stock recommendations. Loh and Mian (2006) show
that analysts who are more accurate tend to have more profitable recommendations. Ertimur et
al. (2007) extend this line of literature by showing that the positive relation between accuracy
and profitability holds only for firms whose earnings are value relevant. They also show that
analysts are more effective in translating their earnings forecasts into recommendations when
they do not have conflicts of interests stemming from investment banking activities.
Another line of literature examines the relation between earnings forecasts and stock
recommendations by using different valuation models as proxies for analysts’ private valuation
models. Bradshaw (2004) finds that there is a positive (negative) relation between stock
recommendations and simple heuristic valuation models (residual income valuation models).
This implies that analysts do not use their earnings forecasts in a sophisticated manner in
generating recommendations. Simon and Curtis (2011) extend Bradshaw’s work by showing that
the negative relation between recommendations and residual income valuations is weakest for
the most accurate analysts. Barniv et al. (2009) and Chen and Chen (2009) show that even
though the relation between recommendations and sophisticated earnings models is negative,
analysts are showing improvements in their translations of earnings forecasts into
recommendations in the post regulations period. Ke and Yu (2009) analyze different

7

explanations for why analysts do not effectively translate their earnings forecasts into
recommendations. They argue that analysts could simply be unable to make this transformation
in an efficient manner, could optimistically bias recommendations in order to obtain information
from management, or could be affected by psychological biases. I extend this line of literature by
examining a different factor pertinent to firm valuation, namely political connections, which
affects how analysts translate earnings forecasts into stock recommendations.
2.2.

Political Contributions
In this study, I use political contributions to proxy for a firm’s political connections.4

There are two competing theories in the economics and political science literature that seek to
explain why firms make political contributions to politicians: the theory of investment in
political capital and the theory of consumption.
If political contributions are an investment in political capital, the firm will realize returns
on its investment as the politician grants favors to the firm throughout his tenure in office. Stigler
(1971) theorizes that government officials influence firms’ financial performance through direct
subsidies, favorable tax treatment, government contracts, and barriers to entry. However,
politicians who receive contributions can also affect policy outcomes through unobservable
actions such quid pro quo purchases of legislative votes, legislative pressure on regulatory
agencies (Snyder 1990), as well as buying access for an opportunity to make the firm’s concerns
known to legislators directly (Hall and Wayman 1990). Ultimately, under the theory of political
investment, the final result of the politician’s actions will be to increase the firm’s future revenue
or profitability.

4

Please see Section 4 for a detailed explanation of how political contributions serve to measure political
connections.
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If the market views the firm’s political contributions as an investment with positive net
present value, there should be a positive relation between political contributions and future
returns. Indeed, Cooper et al. (2010) find that political contributions are positively related to
future stock returns and future operating performance. The authors develop a new measure of
political connectedness by using the number of politicians to whom a firm makes political
contributions. In addition, Claessens et al. (2008) find that Brazilian firms that made political
contributions experienced higher stock returns around the 1998 and 2002 elections than firms
that did not make contributions. However, other studies find an adverse effect of political
contributions. For example, Aggarwal et al. (2012) find a negative relation between the amount
of campaign contributions and future stock returns. They also show that firms which contribute
have worse corporate governance and conclude that political donations are symptomatic of
agency problems.
Although the majority of studies on political contributions rely on the theory of political
investment, most studies find only weak, or no evidence, that contributions affect policy.
Tullock’s (1972) puzzle seeks to determine why there is so little money in U.S. politics. If
political contributions are made with the intent of earning a rate of return and the value of public
policy has significant worth to corporations, Tullock argues that firms would want to give
exponentially more money to politicians (soft money loopholes have traditionally been available
even if PAC contributions were to reach the legal limit). Hart (2001) points out that we still
know very little about why some firms choose to make campaign contributions and others do
not, and why some firms give a lot while others give a little. In addition, the investment in
political capital motivation raises the concern of an “undemocratic exchange of policy for
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dollars” (Gordon et al. 2007). The authors point out that even if this exchange exists it will be
difficult to detect because the politicians will conceal their actions for fear of being exposed.
There has been only weak evidence that political contributions have an effect on the
voting behavior of members of Congress. Ansolabehere et al. (2003) summarize the results of 40
studies that examine the connection between campaign contributions and congressional voting
behavior. They find that most studies report either weak or insignificant results and conclude that
“contributions explain a miniscule fraction of the variation in voting behavior in the U.S.
Congress”. However, using legislators’ roll-call votes as a measure of favor-granting often leads
to significant measurement error (De Figueiredo and Edwards 2007). First, the true dependent
variable is policy outcomes, not voting behavior. Legislators can provide access to the policymaking process or influence over regulatory bodies instead of providing votes. Since voting is a
very public and transparent forum, many politicians would not be likely to grant favors to firms
through voting in exchange for political contributions. Second, the purchase of roll-call votes
would imply a mechanical, political spot market. However, relationships between politicians and
firms tend be long-term in nature and favors are usually granted as the opportunity arises during
the legislator’s term in office (Snyder 1992). Third, there is likely an endogeneity problem
because political contributions can influence votes, but votes can also influence contributions.
A recent study by De Figueiredo and Edwards (2007) overcomes many of these issues by
examining the effect of state-level campaign contributions by telecommunications companies on
regulatory policy decisions of state public utility commissions. They show that contributions to
state legislators significantly affect policy outcomes. The authors thus provide strong evidence
supporting the political investment theory by using a direct measure of policy impact instead of
noisy measures traditionally used in the literature such as roll-call votes by legislators.

10

The alternative competing theory proposes that political contributions are a form of
consumption and not an investment. If this is true, the firm will not have an expectation of being
rewarded with favorable legislation in the future. Any money donated by the firm will simply be
an expression of individual political participation. Furthermore, some managers will give
because they are ideologically motivated, have personal preferences over candidates and parties,
or desire to be appointed to cabinet positions or ambassadorships (Aggarwal et al. 2012).
Ansolabehere et al. 2003 argue that the theory of consumption is more likely to explain why
firms make political contributions since all of the firms’ donations ultimately come from
individuals. They state that individuals essentially donate because they are ideologically
motivated and wish to participate in politics, not because they expect politicians to reciprocate
favors to the firm where they are employed. They further show that the amount given is usually
very small per individual and per firm and these insignificant donations are not likely to
influence politicians. They conclude that the small dollar amounts of political donations which
come from many different individuals are not being made to purchase policy.
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3.
3.1.

HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

The Effect of Political Connections on Recommendation Informativeness
I first analyze whether a firm’s political connections impact the informativeness of

analysts’ stock recommendations. Snyder (1992) finds that political contributions are more
reflective of long-term investments rather than short-term, quid pro quo investments. He shows
that firms tend to donate to the same politicians over time, to younger representatives, and to
candidates running for offices that are “stepping stones” to higher offices which are more
influential. The long-term relationships between firms and politicians often manifest into
political favors for the donating firms as opportunities arise during the legislator’s tenure in
office. For example, studies find that politically connected firms receive preferential access to
bank financing (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006), are awarded more government procurement
contracts (Goldman et al. 2012), and are more likely to receive a government bailout in times of
financial distress (Faccio et al. 2006). Other studies find that political connectedness is directly
related to firm valuation. Faccio (2006) uses an international sample of firms and finds that there
is an increase in firm value at the announcement of officers or large shareholders entering
politics. In addition, Faccio and Parsley (2009) find a 1.7% decline in firm value for companies
headquartered in the town of a politician who has died unexpectedly. These studies provide
strong evidence that political connections matter for investors.
However, it is difficult for analysts to be able to predict the favorable effects of political
connections over the short-term through earnings forecasts due to uncertainty regarding the
timing of politicians’ actions and the legislative process. On the other hand, analysts’ stock
recommendations are issued for longer time horizons and even if analysts cannot anticipate the
short-term effects on the subsequent period’s earnings, the long-term window of the
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recommendation should capture the impact of the change in expected future cash flows.
Assuming analysts can effectively incorporate the effects of political connections into stock
recommendations, this will result in recommendations being more informative to investors.
Alternatively, if analysts are unable to use other information to resolve uncertainty effectively,
stock recommendations will be less informative.

This leads to my first non-directional

hypothesis which is H1: Political connections are not related to recommendation
informativeness.
3.2.

The Effect of Political Connections on Accuracy and Informativeness
Next, I investigate how political connections affect the relation between forecast accuracy

and recommendation informativeness. Chen et al. (2010) find that analysts have worse forecast
accuracy for firms that are politically connected. This is because it is difficult for analysts to
predict the effects of political decisions on firms’ future earnings streams. There is also evidence
that future earnings volatility is higher for politically connected firms which is consistent with
increased uncertainty associated with politicians’ actions (Cooper et al. 2010). Since earnings
predictability is much lower for firms with political connections, it is possible that analysts will
rely less on earnings forecasts in their private valuation models. Accordingly, there will be a
lower association between earnings forecast accuracy and recommendation informativeness.
On the other hand, since political relationships between firms and politicians tend to be
long-term, experienced analysts will have many years of experience following a politically
connected firm. Analysts that have such long-standing relationships with companies will build
up very valuable, in-depth knowledge of the firm, quality of management, industry expertise, and
firm-specific, idiosyncratic information. Over an analyst’s tenure following a firm, the analyst
will experience the firm establishing political connections in some years, terminating
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connections in other years, and strengthening or weakening connections in still other years.
Analysts will have the opportunity to learn from the effect of differing degrees of political
connections manifesting into political favors which influence future reported earnings. Thus, the
analyst’s specialized knowledge which has been developed over time should improve forecast
accuracy for these types of firms. Therefore, it is possible that analysts who have more
experience with politically connected firms or analysts who perform more private information
search for these firms will rely more on earnings forecasts in their private valuation models. This
will result in a higher association between earnings forecast accuracy and recommendation
informativeness. This leads to my second non-directional hypothesis which is H2: Political
connections do not affect the consistency between analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy and stock
recommendation informativeness.
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4.
4.1.

POLITICAL CONNECTIONS MEASUREMENT

Political Contributions
Firms that would like to contribute to federal candidates and political parties are required

by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 (FECA) to create political action committees
(PACs). Firms are allowed to pay for the start-up, overhead, and fundraising expenses of the
PAC but cannot give funds from the treasury to the PAC for the purpose of contributing to a
federal candidate. PAC contributions are mainly donated by the firm’s managers. In my sample,
11.8% of publicly traded firms have PACs. Approximately, one-third of all industries do not
have any firms with PACs. PACs are allowed to make direct contributions to candidates, also
called “hard money” contributions.5 In addition, PACs cannot give more than $10,000 in a 2year election cycle to any particular candidate.
Corporate political contributions have been used extensively in the prior literature to
measure political connections for several reasons (Myers 2005). First, firms have been required
to file publicly available, detailed information with the FEC since 1979 on their political
contributions made through their PACs. Second, since firms must report the amount of money
given by the PAC and the identity of the receiving political candidate, the firm-candidate
relationship is a direct and powerful measure of a political connection. The Lobby Reform Act of
1995 also requires firms to disclose all expenditures on executive and legislative lobbying. Even
though firms spend about ten times more on lobbying than on PAC contributions, lobbying
expenses usually cannot be attributed to any politician directly, and thus are indirect measures of

5

Firms have also been able to make “soft money” donations directly to political parties for non-partisan partybuilding activities and issue advertising which does not specifically name political candidates. The Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 banned soft money contributions. However, in 2010, the ruling on Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission ended the ban on soft money, and firms are now able to provide unlimited funds to
support or oppose political candidates to Super PACs. For issues related to campaign finance reform at the state
level see Gross and Goidel (2003).
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political connections. Third, political contributions are highly correlated with other forms of
political activity such as lobbying and soft money expenditures. For example, Bertrand et al.
(2011) analyze individual lobbyists’ political contributions and find a strong correlation with
their client firms’ contributions. Furthermore, they show that lobbyists systematically switch
issues as the politicians to which they make political contributions switch committee
assignments. Therefore, PAC contributions serve as a strong indicator of a political connection.
I follow Cooper et al. (2010) and design my measures of political connections based on
the number of supported candidates. They argue that if hard money contributions are correlated
with other ways in which the firm establishes relationships with politicians, the number of
politicians that a firm supports is a good proxy for a firm’s political involvement. Additionally,
Ansolabehere et al. (2003) state that only 4% of all PAC contributions are at or near the $10,000
FEC limit and the average PAC contribution is only $1,700. Therefore, since PAC contributions
are not binding and the limit is an immaterial amount to the firm, it is not the dollar amount of
the contribution that matters but rather to whom the connection is made.
4.2.

Measures using Political Contributions
The main measure of political connections, following Cooper et al. (2010), is:
∑

Candidatesjt is equal to one if the firm has contributed to candidate j in year t.
POLITICALCandidates equals 1 if CANDIDATES is greater than the industry-year mean, and 0
otherwise.
I also use the authors’ three alternative measures to create more refined and powerful
measures of political connections. The second proxy weighs equation (1) by factors related to the
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strength of the relationship between the firm and the candidate. This is because firms tend to
build relationships with politicians over long periods of time (Snyder 1992). To capture the
strength of the relationship, I estimate the following equation:
∑

Candidatesjt is equal to one if the firm has contributed to candidate j over in year t. Incumbents
are more likely to have a greater number of corporate contributors and receive a greater dollar
amount of contributions (Snyder 1990, Gross and Goidel 2003). Therefore, I include Ijt as equal
to one if the candidate is incumbent at time t, and 0 otherwise. The ratio

captures the

strength of the candidate’s party in relation to the opposing party. NCVjt is the number of votes
that candidate j’s party holds in office at time t. NOVjt is the number of votes that candidate j’s
opposing party holds in office at time t, and rellengthjt is the number of continuous months of the
firm-candidate relationship. POLITICALStrength equals 1 if STRENGTH is greater than the
industry-year mean, and 0 otherwise.
The third proxy weighs equation (1) by factors related to the ability of the candidate to
help the firm. Specifically, the ability of the politician to assist the firm increases significantly if
the firm is located in the same state or district (Kroszner and Stratmann 1998). To capture the
ability of the politician to help the firm, I estimate the following equation:
∑

HomeCandidatejt is equal to one if the firm has contributed to candidate j in year t and the firm is
headquartered in the same state in which the candidate is running for office. All other variables
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are defined above. POLITICALAbility equals 1 if ABILITY is greater than the industry-year mean,
and 0 otherwise.
The fourth proxy weighs equation (1) by factors related to the power of the candidate.
This is because the prior literature shows that politicians who are committee chairs or serve on
powerful committees receive more contributions than other politicians (Grier and Munger 1991).
To capture the power of the politician, I estimate the following equation:
∑

[∑

]

Rankmt is the reciprocal of candidate j’s rank on committee m (where rank =1 for the most
important member, rank = 2 for the next important member, etc.). Median Rankmt is the median
number of members on committee m. All other variables are defined above. POLITICALPower
equals 1 if POWER is greater than the industry-year mean, and 0 otherwise.
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5.
5.1.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Benchmark Model of Recommendation Informativeness
To examine the relation between forecast accuracy and recommendation informativeness,

I follow Ertimur et al. (2007) and first estimate the following benchmark model for the pooled
sample of all stock recommendations and earnings forecasts:
RET = α0 + α1PMAFE + α2FIRMEXP + α3BSIZE + α4N_FIRMS + α5REC_FREQ +
α6LFR + α7N_ANALYSTS + α8REG + ε

(5)

For expositional purposes, analyst, firm, forecast, and year subscripts are omitted. I
measure forecast accuracy, PMAFE, as the relative forecast accuracy which compares an
analyst’s absolute forecast error to the mean absolute forecast error of all analysts following the
firm (Clement 1999) as described below:

where
and

is the absolute forecast error for earnings forecast k that analyst i issues for firm j
is the mean absolute forecast error for firm j. Clement (1999) shows that this measure

of relative accuracy controls for firm-year effects and reduces heteroskedasticity in forecast error
distributions across firms. The equation is multiplied by -1 so that higher values of PMAFE
connote higher levels of accuracy. I expect α1 to be positive and significant consistent with the
prior literature which finds a positive relation between accuracy and informativeness (Loh and
Mian 2006, Ertimur et al. 2007).
Recommendation informativeness, RET, is the market-adjusted return to recommendation
k made by analyst i for firm j. The buy-and-hold return is computed from the day before the
recommendation date until the earlier of 30 days or 2 days before the recommendation is revised
or reiterated. For buy (hold and sell) recommendations, $1 is invested (shorted) in the
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recommended stock. Firm experience, FIRMEXP, is the number of years through year t for
which analyst i supplied forecasts for firm j. Brokerage firm size, BSIZE, is the logarithm of the
number of analysts employed by the brokerage that analyst i works for during year t. Number of
firms, N_FIRMS, is the number of firms for which analyst i issues annual forecasts during the
year in which the recommendation is made. Recommendation frequency, REC_FREQ, is the
number of recommendations analyst i issues for firm j during year t. Leader-follower ratio, LFR,
is the cumulative number of days by which the preceding two forecasts lead forecast k divided by
the cumulative number of days by which the subsequent two forecasts follow forecast k
following Cooper et al. (2001). Number of analysts, N_ANALYSTS, is the number of analysts
who issue forecasts and recommendations for firm j during year t. Regulated industry, REG,
equals 1 if the firm operates in the financial services industry (one-digit SIC code 6) or in the
utilities industry (two-digit SIC code 49), and 0 otherwise.
5.2.

The Effect of Political Connections on Accuracy and Informativeness
Next, I examine how political connections affect recommendation informativeness as

well as the relation between accuracy and informativeness. I supplement the benchmark model
with the political connections proxy and the interaction between political connections and
forecast accuracy:
RET = β0 + β1POLITICALi + β2PMAFE + β3PMAFE*POLITICALi + β4FIRMEXP
+ β5BSIZE + β6N_FIRMS + β7REC_FREQ + β8LFR + β9N_ANALYSTS
+ β10REG + ε

(6)

POLITICALi is one of four proxies for political connections. Following Cooper et al.
(2010), I use the following constructs to design measures for political connectedness: (1)
CANDIDATES is the number of supported candidates, (2) STRENGTH is the number of
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supported, incumbent candidates weighted by the length of the firm-candidate relationship, (3)
ABILITY is the number of supported, incumbent candidates that hold office in the same state
where the firm is headquartered, and (4) POWER is the number of supported, incumbent
candidates weighted the power of the candidate. POLITICALi equals 1 if the measure is greater
than the industry-year mean, and 0 otherwise. See Section 4 for details on variable construction.
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6.
6.1.

DATA AND MEASUREMENTS

Sample Selection
The sample uses the Compustat annual database, CRSP daily stock prices, I/B/E/S detail

history file, and I/B/E/S detail recommendations file from 1993 – 2011. The sample begins in
1993 because this is the first year stock recommendations are made available in I/B/E/S. Every
recommendation is matched to an annual earnings forecast from the same analyst and the same
firm during the 30-day period prior to and including the issue date of the recommendation. Firmyears must have at least three analysts following the firm to remain in the sample because my
accuracy measure for an analyst is relative to the average accuracy of all other analysts following
the firm (Clement 1999).
For political contribution data, I obtain the database of the Federal Election Commission
(FEC) filings through the Center for Responsive Politics. This database contains all corporate
political action committee (PAC) donations to individual political candidates running for federal
office in the House of Representatives, Senate, and Presidency. I do not obtain political
contributions from individuals, labor organizations, trade organizations, party committees,
private companies, or subsidiaries of foreign firms because these sources of monetary influence
are not related to the firm’s PAC. To calculate a candidate’s committee ranking, I acquire data on
House and Senate committee assignments and rankings from Charles Stewart’s Congressional
Data Page.6
I manually match the names of firms provided by the FEC database to CRSP company
names. I successfully match approximately 56% of 1,820 PAC corporate names to CRSP data
and about 80% of the dollar amount of contributions. This is consistent with Grier et al. (1994)
who match 50 - 60% of names and 80% of contributions. After using the SEC’s EDGAR
6

I thank Charles Stewart for providing access to this data (http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html).
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database to properly match companies with name changes, I obtain 809,334 political
contributions from 1,019 unique firms. The former figure includes multiple contributions to
some of the same candidates. These contributions are spread over 8,901 different political
candidates. After merging the FEC database with I/B/E/S and CRSP, I obtain 261,295 analystfirm-year observations representing 8,641 unique firms.
6.2.

Descriptive Statistics
Panel A and Panel B of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for financial analyst

characteristics for the full sample of firms. In Panel A, the mean abnormal return to stock
recommendations is 6.0% over the 30 day measurement period. Approximately 74.8% of the
recommendations lead to positive abnormal returns. The mean (median) of PMAFE is 0.012
(0.111). Analysts have approximately 3 years of firm-specific experience, follow 16 different
companies, and issue about 2 recommendations per year for the firms they cover. The average
brokerage firm in the sample employs 57 analysts. Analyst coverage is approximately 13
analysts per firm. Of the total 8,641 firms in the sample, 1,019 (11.8%) firms have political
contributions and 7,622 (88.2%) firms do not have contributions.
Panel B of Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics comparing firms that make political
contributions to firms that do not make such contributions using propensity-matched scoring. I
create a matched sample based on the predicted probabilities from the 1st stage probit regression
presented in Appendix B. The propensity score matching procedure produces a matched sample
of 33,132 control observations leading to a combined sample of 66,264 observations. Analysts of
firms that contribute have less informative recommendations (4.7%) than analysts of firms that
do not contribute (5.6%). However, there is no difference in analysts’ forecast accuracy for
contributors versus non-contributors. Analysts that follow firms that contribute tend to have
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Financial Analyst Characteristics
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Pooled Sample
Variable
RET
Fraction of positive RET
PMAFE
FIRMEXP
BSIZE
N_FIRMS
REC_FREQ
LFR
N_ANALYSTS
REG

N
261,295
261,295
261,295
261,295
261,295
261,295
261,295
261,295
261,295
261,295

Mean
0.060
0.748
0.012
3.121
57.041
15.799
1.875
2.856
13.134
0.171

Std. Dev.
0.151
0.685
2.953
49.332
10.483
1.950
8.364
8.271
0.376

Min
(0.944)
(2.580)
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.002
3.000
0.000

Q1
0.002
(0.399)
1.000
18.000
10.000
1.000
0.415
6.000
0.000

Median
0.046
0.111
2.000
40.000
14.000
1.000
1.000
11.000
0.000

Q3
0.114
0.567
4.000
84.000
19.000
2.000
2.484
18.000
0.000

Max
7.609
1.000
29.000
247.000
114.000
66.000
376.000
52.000
1.000

Panel B: Descriptive Statistics by Political Involvement (Propensity Score Matching)
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTORS
NON-CONTRIBUTORS
Variable
RET
Fraction of positive RET
PMAFE
FIRMEXP
BSIZE
N_FIRMS
REC_FREQ
LFR
N_ANALYSTS
REG

Mean
0.047
0.762
0.021
4.013
61.220
17.448
1.944
2.525
18.069
0.180

Median Std Dev
0.038
0.108
0.164
0.859
3.000
3.672
49.000
50.105
15.000
12.733
1.000
2.389
1.000
6.212
17.000
8.686
0.000
0.384

Mean
0.056
0.758
0.016
3.493
64.141
15.544
1.919
2.665
15.245
0.113

Median Std Dev
0.044
0.124
0.157
0.837
2.000
3.220
50.000
51.987
14.000
10.479
1.000
2.306
1.000
6.934
14.000
8.250
0.000
0.317

Difference in
Means
(0.008) ***
0.004
0.005
0.520 ***
(2.921) ***
1.903 ***
0.025
(0.140) ***
2.824 ***
0.067 ***

There are 261,295 observations estimated over 1993 - 2011. RET is the market-adjusted return to recommendation k made by
analyst i for firm j . The buy-and-hold return is computed from the day before the recommendation date until the earlier of 30
days or 2 days before the recommendation is revised or reiterated. For buy (hold and sell) recommendations, $1 is invested
(shorted) in the recommended stock. PMAFE is the difference between the absolute forecast error for analyst i for firm j at time
t scaled by the mean absolute forecast error for firm j at time t . FIRMEXP is the number of years through year t for which
analyst i supplied forecasts for firm j . BSIZE is the logarithm of the number of analysts employed by the brokerage that analyst
i works for during year t . N_FIRMS is the number of firms for which analyst i issues annual forecasts during the year in
which the recommendation is made. REC_FREQ is the number of recommendations analyst i issues for firm j during year t .
LFR, leader-follower ratio, is the cumulative number of days by which the preceding two forecasts lead forecast k divided by
the cumulative number of days by which the subsequent two forecasts follow forecast k . N_ANALYSTS is the number of
analysts who issue forecasts and recommendations for firm j during year t . REG equals 1 if firm is in financial services industry
(one-digit SIC code 6) or utilities industry (two-digit SIC code 49), and 0 otherwise. Propensity scores are calculated using the
1st Stage Probit model in Appendix B and results in 66,264 observations for the combined treatment and control groups.

more years of firm-specific experience (4.0) and cover more companies (17.4) than analysts who
follow firms that do not contribute (3.5 and 15.5, respectively). In addition, analysts who cover
contributors tend to work at brokerage firms that employ fewer analysts (61.2) and tend to have
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less timely forecasts (2.5) than analysts who cover non-contributors (64.1 and 2.7, respectively).
The number of analysts following a political contributor (18.1) is significantly larger than the
number of analysts following a non-contributor (15.2) which is consistent with contributing
firms being the largest publicly-traded firms. Lastly, the percentage of firms that analysts cover
which are in a regulated industry is significantly larger for contributors (18.0%) than for noncontributors (11.3%).
Panel A of Table 2 report the descriptive statistics for the political contributions that
firms make. The average firm donates $117,360 in total political contributions during any 2-year
election cycle. Total political contributions range from $5 to $3,827,600. Firms make
approximately 93 political contributions during any 2-year election cycle although the maximum
is 2,074 contributions. Firms support anywhere between 1 and 518 candidates every election
cycle, with the average firm supporting 35 candidates. Although there is much variation in the
number of candidates that some firms support cross-sectionally, there is little variation on a perfirm basis in the number of supported candidates over time.
Firms donate about $3,353 per candidate per election cycle ($117,360/35 candidates).
Interestingly, Cooper et al. (2010) report an average of $2,086 per candidate from total mean
contributions of only $64,694 and 31 supported candidates over the period 1979 - 2004.
Therefore, firms are still not constrained by the FEC contributions limit which is $10,000 per
candidate over an election cycle. Even though firms are contributing significantly more in total
dollar amounts, they are supporting a similar number of candidates per election cycle. It is
possible the larger amounts of money being donated are reflective of the benefits that firms
expect to obtain from connections to politicians which would be supportive of the theory of
investment in political capital.
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Table 2
Firm Political Contributions Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Political Contributions Statistics
Variable
Mean
Total Contributions
$117,360
Number of Contributions
93
Number of Candidates
35

Min
$5
1
1

Q1
$11,000
11
5

Panel B: Political Contributions by Largest Industry Contributors
Amount of Political Contributions
Industry
1) Financial
2) Utilities
3) Telecommunications
4) Transportation
5) Pharmaceutical Products
6) Petroleum and Natural Gas
7) Electronic Equipment
8) Machinery
9) Retail
10) Business Services

Republican Democratic
$5,551,825
$3,474,692
3,571,199
2,340,800
3,099,786
2,263,322
3,324,755
1,827,245
2,828,821
1,783,923
2,761,201
736,980
1,920,415
1,385,532
1,759,068
961,687
1,793,140
893,820
1,304,083
1,121,505

Total
$9,026,517
5,911,999
5,363,108
5,152,000
4,612,744
3,498,181
3,305,947
2,720,755
2,686,960
2,425,588

Median
$35,499
33
16

Q3
$115,100
104
44

Max
$3,827,600
2,074
518

Number of Supported Candidates
Republican
2,411
1,678
1,058
1,010
1,066
1,345
520
705
780
654

Democratic
1,567
1,123
852
677
723
425
235
390
419
532

Total
3,978
2,801
1,910
1,687
1,789
1,770
755
1,095
1,199
1,186

This table reports the total federal political contributions for the top 10 donating firms over the period 1993-2011. Data is obtained from
the Federal Election Commission (FEC) through the Center for Responsive Politics on political contributions to House, Senate, and
Presidential elections. Data are excluded from all noncorporate contributions, contributions from private firms and subsidiaries of
foreign firms. The sample includes 809,334 contributions made by 1,019 unique firms. The table reports firm contribution
characteristics per firm, per election cycle.
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Panel B of Table 2 reports political contributions by the ten largest industry contributors
based on the Fama-French (1997) 49 industry classification7. Consistent with Aggarwal et al.
(2012), the top contributors are financial/banking, utilities, telecommunications, and
transportation. In line with Republicans traditionally receiving higher total dollar contributions
per firm than Democrats, every industry donates significantly more to the Republican party than
to the Democratic party. Prior to 2004, the financial industry gave approximately 55% of their
total contributions to Republicans. Since this time period, however, the industry has actually
donated a slight majority of their contributions to the Democratic party. All of the industries
support a greater number of Republican candidates than Democratic candidates.
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlations for the full sample. The correlation between
political contributions (POLITICAL) and informativeness (RET) is -0.053 indicating that when a
firm has more connections to politicians, analysts’ recommendations are less informative.
Political contributions (POLITICAL) and forecast accuracy (PMAFE) are positively related,
0.004, and is significant at the 5% level. Forecast accuracy (PMAFE) and informativeness (RET)
have a positive and significant correlation, 0.026, consistent with the prior literature. There is a
positive correlation between informativeness (RET) and brokerage firm size of 0.030,
recommendation frequency of 0.008, and forecast timeliness of 0.037. There is also a negative
correlation between informativeness (RET) and both the number of firms followed of -0.013 and
analyst coverage of -0.047. The majority of the correlations among the independent variables are
statistically significant but their magnitudes are not large.This suggests that multicollinearity
should not be of concern. I investigate the issue of multicollinearity further by calculating the
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) in all multivariate regressions that follow.
7

Banking, Insurance, and Trading are all included in “Financial” because the Center for Responsive Politics
generally aggregates these industries when reporting the largest source of campaign contributions to federal
candidates and parties.
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Table 3
Pearson Correlations
RET

POLITICAL

PMAFE

FIRMEXP

BSIZE

N_FIRMS

REC FREQ

LFR

N_ANALYSTS

RET
POLITICAL

-0.053

PMAFE

0.026

0.004^

FIRMEXP

0.001#

0.075

-0.001#

BSIZE

0.030

0.014

0.014

0.031

N_FIRMS

-0.013

-0.036

-0.011

0.164

0.022

REC FREQ

0.008

0.014

-0.006

0.057

-0.042

0.077

LFR

0.037

-0.025

0.045

-0.001#

0.021

-0.005

-0.005

N_ANALYSTS

-0.047

0.289

0.020

0.208

0.034

0.042

0.020

-0.051

REG

-0.029

-0.088

0.001#

0.019

0.016

0.185

-0.025

0.000#

-0.017

All correlations are significant at the 1% level except those marked with a "#" which are not significant, those with a "!" which are significant at the 10%
level, and those with a "^" which are significant at the 5% level. There are 261,295 observations estimated over 1993 - 2011. RET is the market-adjusted
return to recommendation k made by analyst i for firm j . The buy-and-hold return is computed from the day before the recommendation date until the
earlier of 30 days or 2 days before the recommendation is revised or reiterated. For buy (hold and sell) recommendations, $1 is invested (shorted) in the
recommended stock. POLITICAL equals 1 if politically connected based on the measure POLITICALCandidates , and 0 otherwise. PMAFE is the difference
between the absolute forecast error for analyst i for firm j at time t scaled by the mean absolute forecast error for firm j at time t . FIRMEXP is the
number of years through year t for which analyst i supplied forecasts for firm j . BSIZE is the logarithm of the number of analysts employed by the
brokerage that analyst i works for during year t . N_FIRMS is the number of firms for which analyst i issues annual forecasts during the year in which
the recommendation is made. REC_FREQ is the number of recommendations analyst i issues for firm j during year t . LFR, leader-follower ratio, is the
cumulative number of days by which the preceding two forecasts lead forecast k divided by the cumulative number of days by which the subsequent
two forecasts follow forecast k . N_ANALYSTS is the number of analysts who issue forecasts and recommendations for firm j during year t . REG
equals 1 if firm is in financial services industry (one-digit SIC code 6) or utilities industry (two-digit SIC code 49), and 0 otherwise.
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7.
7.1.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSES

Benchmark Regression of Recommendation Informativeness
In Table 4, I first report the results of the relation between forecast accuracy and

recommendation informativeness using the benchmark model from Ertimur et al. (2007). As
expected, there is a significantly positive relation between informativeness and accuracy
(PMAFE = 0.0034) indicating that analysts who have more accurate earnings forecasts tend to
have more informative stock recommendations. The results also indicate that analysts with more
years of firm-specific experience have more informative recommendations (FIRMEXP =
0.0005). Furthermore, informativeness increases with brokerage firm size (BSIZE = 0.0001),
recommendation frequency (REC_FREQ = 0.0005), and earnings forecast timeliness (LFR =
0.0006) as expected. However, informativeness decreases when analyst following is greater
(N_ANALYSTS = -0.0008) and when firms are in a regulated industry (REG = -0.0128).
7.2.

Main Political Connections Regression
Table 5 presents the main results of the study which address hypotheses 1 and 2. In

column 1, the proxy for political connections (POLITICAL) is based on the number of supported
candidates. There is a negative and significant relation between recommendation informativeness
(RET) and political connections (POLITICAL) of -1.1867. This indicates that analysts appear to
be unable to use other information in an efficient manner to resolve the uncertainty associated
with political connections. There is also a negative and significant relation between
informativeness

(RET)

and

the

interaction

of

accuracy

and

political

connections

(PMAFE*POLITICAL) of -0.3837. This signifies that analysts rely less on earnings forecasts in
private valuation models used in generating stock recommendations for politically connected
firms due to these types of firms having greater earnings uncertainty.
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Table 4
Relation between Accuracy and Informativeness - Benchmark Model
RET = α 0 + α 1 PMAFE + α 2 FIRMEXP + α 3 BSIZE + α 4 N_FIRMS
+ α 5 REC_FREQ + α 6 LFR + α 7 N_ANALYSTS + α 8 REG + ε

Intercept
PMAFE
FIRMEXP
BSIZE
N_FIRMS
REC_FREQ
LFR
N_ANALYSTS
REG
R2
Year Dummies

Coefficient
0.0547
0.0034
0.0005
0.0001
0.0000
0.0005
0.0006
-0.0008
-0.0128

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Std. Error
0.0013
0.0003
0.0001
0.0000
0.0000
0.0002
0.0000
0.0000
0.0008

t -statistic
40.91
10.33
4.90
11.34
0.93
3.50
16.94
-22.06
-16.13

1.50%
included

*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. The t-statistics are based on
standard errors clustered by analyst.There are 261,295 observations estimated over 1993 - 2011.
RET is the market-adjusted return to recommendation k made by analyst i for firm j . The buyand-hold return is computed from the day before the recommendation date until the earlier of 30
days or 2 days before the recommendation is revised or reiterated. For buy (hold and sell)
recommendations, $1 is invested (shorted) in the recommended stock. PMAFE is the difference
between the absolute forecast error for analyst i for firm j at time t scaled by the mean
absolute forecast error for firm j at time t . FIRMEXP is the number of years through year t for
which analyst i supplied forecasts for firm j . BSIZE is the logarithm of the number of analysts
employed by the brokerage that analyst i works for during year t . N_FIRMS is the number of
firms for which analyst i issues annual forecasts during the year in which the recommendation
is made. REC_FREQ is the number of recommendations analyst i issues for firm j during year
t . LFR, leader-follower ratio, is the cumulative number of days by which the preceding two
forecasts lead forecast k divided by the cumulative number of days by which the subsequent
two forecasts follow forecast k . N_ANALYSTS is the number of analysts who issue forecasts
and recommendations for firm j during year t . REG equals 1 if firm is in financial services
industry (one-digit SIC code 6) or utilities industry (two-digit SIC code 49), and 0 otherwise.

Informativeness (RET) is positively and significantly related to forecast accuracy
(PMAFE = 0.3850) indicating that, on average, analysts use their earnings forecasts in generating
stock recommendations. Analysts who work at larger brokerage firms (BSIZE = 0.0071), issue
more recommendations in a given year (REC_FREQ = 0.0551), and have more timely forecasts
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relative to other analysts following the same firm (LFR = 0.0592) tend to have more informative
recommendations. On the other hand, analysts who cover firms that have a larger analyst
following (N_ANALYSTS = -0.0680) or are in a regulated industry (REG = -1.2111) tend to
have less informative recommendations.
The main results are consistent across the other three more powerful measures of political
connections. In column 2, the proxy for political connections is based on the strength of the firmcandidate relationship (STRENGTH). The proxy in column 3 is based on the number of “samestate” candidates (ABILITY). Lastly, the proxy in column 4 is based on the number of candidates
weighted by the power of the candidates (POWER). All three of the alternative political
connection proxies have a negative and significant relation with recommendation
informativeness (-1.4166, -0.6708, and -1.3041, respectively). In addition, for all of the political
connections proxies there is a negative and significant relation between informativeness and the
interaction of accuracy and political connections (-0.3731, -0.3194, and -0.3794, respectively).
Since these more refined measures take into the strength of the relationship, the ability of the
candidate to help the firm, and the power of the candidate, they provide additional reinforcement
that analysts’ forecasts are less consistent with recommendations when the firms they follow
have political connections.
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Table 5
The Effect of Political Connections on the Relation between Accuracy and Informativeness
RET = β 0 + β 1 POLITICAL + β 2 PMAFE + β 3 PMAFE*POLITICAL + β 4 FIRMEXP
+ β 5 BSIZE + β 6 N_FIRMS + β 7 REC_FREQ + β 8 LFR + β 9 N_ANALYSTS + β 10 REG + ε

Intercept
POLITICAL
PMAFE
PMAFE*POLITICAL
FIRMEXP
BSIZE
N_FIRMS
REC_FREQ
LFR
N_ANALYSTS
REG
R2
Year Dummies

Candidates
5.3562
-1.1867
0.3850
-0.3837
0.0596
0.0071
0.0025
0.0551
0.0592
-0.0680
-1.2111

Strength
5.2477
-1.4166
0.3763
-0.3731
0.0603
0.0071
0.0028
0.0541
0.0592
-0.0673
-1.2011

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

1.63%
included

1.63%
included

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Ability
5.8611
-0.6708
0.4082
-0.3194
0.0571
0.0071
0.0020
0.0543
0.0592
-0.0719
-1.2503
1.60%
included

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Power
5.2461
-1.3041
0.3796
-0.3794
0.0597
0.0071
0.0027
0.0553
0.0593
-0.0670
-1.2057

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

1.63%
included

*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. The t-statistics are based on standard errors
clustered by analyst.There are 261,295 observations estimated over 1993 - 2011.
The 4 columns in this table use 4 different proxies for political connections (POLITICAL): Candidates, Strength,
Ability, and Power. POLITICAL equals 1 if politically connected, 0 otherwise. See Appendix A for variable
definitions. RET is the market-adjusted return to recommendation k made by analyst i for firm j . The buy-andhold return is computed from the day before the recommendation date until the earlier of 30 days or 2 days before
the recommendation is revised or reiterated. For buy (hold and sell) recommendations, $1 is invested (shorted) in
the recommended stock. POLITICAL is the number of supported candidates by firm j in year t . PMAFE is the
difference between the absolute forecast error for analyst i for firm j at time t scaled by the mean absolute
forecast error for firm j at time t . FIRMEXP is the number of years through year t for which analyst i supplied
forecasts for firm j . BSIZE is the logarithm of the number of analysts employed by the brokerage that analyst i
works for during year t . N_FIRMS is the number of firms for which analyst i issues annual forecasts during the
year in which the recommendation is made. REC_FREQ is the number of recommendations analyst i issues for
firm j during year t . LFR, leader-follower ratio, is the cumulative number of days by which the preceding two
forecasts lead forecast k divided by the cumulative number of days by which the subsequent two forecasts
follow forecast k . N_ANALYSTS is the number of analysts who issue forecasts and recommendations for firm j
during year t . REG equals 1 if firm is in financial services industry (one-digit SIC code 6) or utilities industry (twodigit SIC code 49), and 0 otherwise.

32

8.
8.1.

SENSITIVITY AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES

Two-Stage Heckman Selection Model
In this section I address potential endogeneity problems due to selection bias. Since the

firm has to decide to establish a political action committee and make political contributions, the
results in the main tests have potential bias. I use the following first-stage probit model based off
Cooper et al. (2010) to estimate the probability that a firm will make political contributions:
ACTIVE = λ0 + λ1SIZE + λ2SALES + λ3EMPLOYEES + λ4BUS_SEG + λ5GEO_SEG
+ λ6BM + λ7LEV + λ8CFO + λ9MARKET_SHARE + λ10HERF
+ λ11REG + λ12INDUSTRY_ACTIVE + ε

(7)

Since the choice of exclusion restrictions is important in executing the selection model
and controlling for endogeneity, I utilize the number of employees in the determinants model as
the primary exclusion restriction. Political action committees (PACs) are established by the firm
but the contributions come entirely from employees, not company resources. Prior studies find
that firms with more employees are more likely to have a PAC (Grier et al. 1994). This is
because PAC contributions have to be raised from employees in sufficient quantities for the PAC
to be effective in its objectives. Furthermore, firms with more employees are better able to pay
the fixed start-up and accounting costs for establishing a PAC. Therefore, the number of
employees is an important determinant of being politically active in the 1st stage model. There is
no economic rationale which would suggest that the number of employees at the firm that the
analyst covers should be significantly related to the recommendation informativeness (the
dependent variable in the 2nd stage).
In model (7) above, ACTIVE equals 1 if the firm has a political action committee, 0
otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value of equity. SALES is the natural
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logarithm of sales. EMPLOYEES is the natural logarithm of the number of employees. BUS_SEG
is the number of business segments. GEO_SEG is the number of geographic segments. BM is
book-to-market ratio. LEV is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities, divided by
total assets. CFO is operating cash flow divided by total assets. MARKET_SHARE is sales
divided by total industry sales. HERF is the Herfindahl index of industry concentration computed
with net sales. REG equals 1 if the firm operates in the financial services industry (one-digit SIC
code 6) or in the utilities industry (two-digit SIC code 49), and 0 otherwise. INDUSTRY_ACTIVE
is the number of firms in a firm's industry with an established political action committee. The
results of the first-stage probit model are included in Appendix B.
The inverse Mills ratio computed from the probit selection in equation (7) is included in
the recommendation informativeness regression below.
PFT = γ0 + γ1POLITICAL + γ2PMAFE + γ3PMAFE*POLITICAL + γ4FIRMEXP
+ γ5BSIZE + γ6N_FIRMS + γ7REC_FREQ + γ8LFR + γ9N_ANALYSTS
+ γ10REG + γ11MILLS + ε

(8)

Table 6 provides the results of the relation between political connections, forecast
accuracy, and informativeness after correcting for self-selection. Overall, the negative relation
between political connections and informativeness (γ1) is consistent with main results of the
paper. The negative relation between informativeness and accuracy when firms are politically
connected (γ3) is also robust under the political connection specifications. I also examine whether
multicollinearity exists in the 2nd stage model by calculating Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs)
for all the independent variables. None of the VIFs, including the Mills ratio, exceed 1.72 which
suggests that multicollinearity is not likely to be a problem in the test design.
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Table 6
Two-Stage Heckman Selection Model Sensitivity Analysis
RET = γ0 + γ 1 POLITICAL + γ 2 PMAFE + γ 3 PMAFE*POLITICAL + γ 4 FIRMEXP + γ 5 BSIZE
+ γ 6 N_FIRMS + γ 7 REC_FREQ + γ 8 LFR + γ 9 N_ANALYSTS + γ 10 REG + γ 11 MILLS + ε

Intercept
POLITICAL
PMAFE
PMAFE*POLITICAL
FIRMEXP
BSIZE
N_FIRMS
REC_FREQ
LFR
N_ANALYSTS
REG
MILLS
2

R
Year Dummies

Candidates
0.6280
-0.4035
0.4043
-0.4524
0.0737
0.0106
0.0059
0.0442
0.0579
0.0130
0.0067
2.0209

Strength
0.7600
-0.5821
0.3887
-0.3807
0.0803
0.0106
0.0063
0.0503
0.0579
0.0114
-0.0187
1.9254

***
***
***
***
***
***
*
***
***
**
***

2.07%
included

2.07%
included

***
***
***
***
***
***
*
***
***
**
***

Ability
0.7214
-0.0662
0.4247
-0.3382
0.0785
0.0107
0.0061
0.0503
0.0578
0.0100
-0.0295
1.9888
2.06%
included

***
***
***
***
***
*
***
***
*
***

Power
0.7542
-0.5137
0.4014
-0.4887
0.0800
0.0106
0.0064
0.0505
0.0579
0.0115
-0.0168
1.9271

***
***
***
***
***
***
*
***
***
**
***

2.07%
included

*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. The t-statistics are based on standard errors
clustered by analyst.There are 187,726 observations estimated over 1993 - 2011. See Appendix B for the results of
the 1st Stage Probit model.
The 4 columns in this table use 4 different proxies for political connections (POLITICAL): Candidates, Strength,
Ability, and Power. POLITICAL equals 1 if politically connected, 0 otherwise. See Appendix A for variable
definitions. RET is the market-adjusted return to recommendation k made by analyst i for firm j . The buy-and-hold
return is computed from the day before the recommendation date until the earlier of 30 days or 2 days before the
recommendation is revised or reiterated. For buy (hold and sell) recommendations, $1 is invested (shorted) in the
recommended stock. POLITICAL is the number of supported candidates by firm j in year t . PMAFE is the
difference between the absolute forecast error for analyst i for firm j at time t scaled by the mean absolute forecast
error for firm j at time t . FIRMEXP is the number of years through year t for which analyst i supplied forecasts for
firm j . BSIZE is the logarithm of the number of analysts employed by the brokerage that analyst i works for during
year t . N_FIRMS is the number of firms for which analyst i issues annual forecasts during the year in which the
recommendation is made. REC_FREQ is the number of recommendations analyst i issues for firm j during year t .
LFR, leader-follower ratio, is the cumulative number of days by which the preceding two forecasts lead forecast k
divided by the cumulative number of days by which the subsequent two forecasts follow forecast k
N_ANALYSTS is the number of analysts who issue forecasts and recommendations for firm j during year t . REG
equals 1 if firm is in financial services industry (one-digit SIC code 6) or utilities industry (two-digit SIC code 49),
and 0 otherwise. MILLS is the inverse Mills ratio from the first stage probit model in Appendix B. Variance Inflation
Factors for all variables are less than 1.72.

8.2.

Propensity-Score Matching
In this section, I use propensity-score matching models to further address endogeneity

concerns. This is because it is possible the Heckman selection model in the previous section fails
to meet the exclusion restriction or because the treatment effects are difficult to estimate due to
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.

an underlying nonlinear functional form. Table 7 reports the results of the relation between
political connections, forecast accuracy, and informativeness after matching on propensity
scores. The results support the negative relation between political connections and
informativeness (δ1) when using all four of the political connection proxies ((number of
Table 7
Propensity Score Matching Sensitivity Analysis
RET = δ0 + δ 1 POLITICAL + δ 2 PMAFE + δ 3 PMAFE*POLITICAL + δ 4 FIRMEXP
+ δ 5 BSIZE + δ 6 N_FIRMS + δ 7 REC_FREQ + δ 8 LFR + δ 9 N_ANALYSTS + δ 10 REG + ε

Intercept
POLITICAL
PMAFE
PMAFE*POLITICAL
FIRMEXP
BSIZE
N_FIRMS
REC_FREQ
LFR
N_ANALYSTS
REG
R2

Candidates
4.4601
-0.7827
0.2091
-0.2220
0.0255
0.0061
0.0033
0.0287
0.0569
-0.0378
-0.4621

Strength
4.3930
-0.8094
0.1888
-0.1625
0.0254
0.0061
0.0035
0.0269
0.0568
-0.0385
-0.4615

***
***
***
*
**
***

***
***
***

1.98%

1.97%

***
***
***
**
***

***
***
***

Ability
4.6262
-0.2511
0.2058
-0.1260
0.0214
0.0061
0.0031
0.0262
0.0570
-0.0411
-0.5180
1.92%

***
**
***
*
***

***
***
***

Power
4.4402
-0.7980
0.2000
-0.2709
0.0290
0.0065
0.0028
0.0270
0.0535
-0.0394
-0.4491

***
***
***
**
**
***

***
***
***

1.94%

*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. The t-statistics are based on standard errors
clustered by analyst.There are 66,264 observations estimated over 1993 - 2011. Propensity scores are calculated
using the 1st Stage Probit model in Appendix B.
The 4 columns in this table use 4 different proxies for political connections (POLITICAL): Candidates, Strength,
Ability, and Power. POLITICAL equals 1 if politically connected, 0 otherwise. See Appendix A for variable
definitions. RET is the market-adjusted return to recommendation k made by analyst i for firm j . The buy-andhold return is computed from the day before the recommendation date until the earlier of 30 days or 2 days before
the recommendation is revised or reiterated. For buy (hold and sell) recommendations, $1 is invested (shorted) in
the recommended stock. POLITICAL is the number of supported candidates by firm j in year t . PMAFE is the
difference between the absolute forecast error for analyst i for firm j at time t scaled by the mean absolute
forecast error for firm j at time t . FIRMEXP is the number of years through year t for which analyst i supplied
forecasts for firm j . BSIZE is the logarithm of the number of analysts employed by the brokerage that analyst i
works for during year t . N_FIRMS is the number of firms for which analyst i issues annual forecasts during the
year in which the recommendation is made. REC_FREQ is the number of recommendations analyst i issues for
firm j during year t . LFR, leader-follower ratio, is the cumulative number of days by which the preceding two
forecasts lead forecast k divided by the cumulative number of days by which the subsequent two forecasts
follow forecast k . N_ANALYSTS is the number of analysts who issue forecasts and recommendations for firm j
during year t . REG equals 1 if firm is in financial services industry (one-digit SIC code 6) or utilities industry (twodigit SIC code 49), and 0 otherwise.
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candidates, strength of firm-candidate relationship, same-state candidates, candidate power).
However, the negative relation between informativeness and accuracy when firms are politically
connected (δ3) is only weakly supported. Since it is still not clear why firms make contributions
(Hart 2001), it is possible that the first-stage determinants model contains correlated omitted
variables which is inducing measurement error in the matching of propensity scores.
8.3.

Analyst All-Star Status
Analysts that are selected as All-Stars by Institutional Investor tend to have more

experience, better reputations, more accurate earnings forecasts, and more informative stock
recommendations (Stickel 1992). Therefore, it is possible that the relation between political
connections and recommendation informativeness is different for All-Stars compared to non-AllStars. Since All-Star analysts have lower forecast errors, on average, it is likely they will use
their earnings forecasts more efficiently as inputs into valuation models in generating stock
recommendations.
In Table 8, I find that the negative relation between political connections and
recommendation informativeness (λ1) holds for both All-Star and non-All-Star analysts.
Interestingly, I find that the negative relation between political connections and recommendation
informativeness for politically connected firms (λ3) holds only for non-All-Star analysts as
expected. This provides evidence that the inefficiency in transforming accurate earnings into
informative recommendations is driven by non-All-Star analysts.
8.4.

Recommendation Upgrades vs. Downgrades
Prior work finds that there is a significantly positive (negative) abnormal return

associated with stock recommendation upgrades (downgrades) (Stickel 1995, Womack 1996).
The authors also find that there is a post-recommendation drift which lasts up to one month for
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Table 8
The Effect of Analyst All-Star Status
RET = λ 0 + λ 1 POLITICAL + λ 2 PMAFE + λ 3 PMAFE*POLITICAL + λ 4 FIRMEXP
+ λ 5 BSIZE + λ 6 N_FIRMS + λ 7 REC_FREQ + λ 8 LFR + λ 9 N_ANALYSTS + λ 10 REG + ε

Candidates
Intercept
6.1450 ***
POLITICAL
-1.2313 ***
PMAFE
0.2571 **
PMAFE*POLITICAL -0.4815
FIRMEXP
-0.0005
BSIZE
-0.0014
N_FIRMS
-0.0144
REC_FREQ
0.1704 *
LFR
0.0661 ***
N_ANALYSTS
-0.1029 ***
REG
-0.9890 ***
n
23,023

All-Star Analysts
Strength
Ability
6.1103 *** 7.9959 ***
-1.5355 *** -0.9376 ***
0.2800 **
0.2439 *
-0.7092 ** -0.5088 *
0.0039
-0.0037
-0.0014
0.0041 **
-0.0147
-0.0274 ***
0.1648 *
0.1623 *
0.0657 *** 0.0640 ***
-0.1002 *** -0.1022 ***
-0.9637 *** -0.7992 ***
23,023
23,023

Non-All-Star Analysts
Power
Candidates
Strength
Ability
Power
7.9774 *** 4.7279 *** 4.6787 *** 6.4379 *** 6.3730 ***
-1.3093 *** -1.1925 *** -1.4402 *** -0.8396 *** -1.2247 ***
0.1746
0.3988 *** 0.3869 *** 0.4073 *** 0.3810 ***
-0.3018
-0.3606 *** -0.3103 **
-0.2982 *** -0.3997 ***
-0.0010
0.0764 *** 0.0765 *** 0.0833 *** 0.0800 ***
0.0039 *
0.0083 *** 0.0082 *** 0.0103 *** 0.0102 ***
-0.0275 *** 0.0023
0.0028
-0.0123 *** -0.0120 ***
0.1584 *
0.0493 *** 0.0488 *** 0.0758 *** 0.0805 ***
0.0640 *** 0.0585 *** 0.0585 *** 0.0588 *** 0.0592 ***
-0.1006 *** -0.0654 *** -0.0647 *** -0.0765 *** -0.0764 ***
-0.7551 *** -1.2195 *** -1.2102 *** -1.1770 *** -1.1495 ***
23,023
238,272
238,272
238,272
238,272

*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by analyst.There are 261,295
observations estimated over 1993 - 2011.
All-Star Analysts are analysts that achieved all-star status at any level as determined by Institutional Investor magazine in year t . The 4 columns in
this table use 4 different proxies for political connections (POLITICAL): Candidates, Strength, Ability, and Power. POLITICAL equals 1 if politically
connected, 0 otherwise. See Appendix A for variable definitions. RET is the market-adjusted return to recommendation k made by analyst i for firm j .
The buy-and-hold return is computed from the day before the recommendation date until the earlier of 30 days or 2 days before the recommendation is
revised or reiterated. For buy (hold and sell) recommendations, $1 is invested (shorted) in the recommended stock. POLITICAL is the number of
supported candidates by firm j in year t . PMAFE is the difference between the absolute forecast error for analyst i for firm j at time t scaled by the
mean absolute forecast error for firm j at time t . FIRMEXP is the number of years through year t for which analyst i supplied forecasts for firm j .
BSIZE is the logarithm of the number of analysts employed by the brokerage that analyst i works for during year t . N_FIRMS is the number of firms
for which analyst i issues annual forecasts during the year in which the recommendation is made. REC_FREQ is the number of recommendations
analyst i issues for firm j during year t . LFR, leader-follower ratio, is the cumulative number of days by which the preceding two forecasts lead
forecast k divided by the cumulative number of days by which the subsequent two forecasts follow forecast k . N_ANALYSTS is the number of
analysts who issue forecasts and recommendations for firm j during year t . REG equals 1 if firm is in financial services industry (one-digit SIC code 6)
or utilities industry (two-digit SIC code 49), and 0 otherwise.
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upgrades and six months for downgrades. In this section, I test whether the relation between
political connections and recommendation informativeness changes when the analyst issues a
recommendation upgrade or downgrade.
In Table 9, I find that the negative relation between political connections and
recommendation informativeness (ζ1) is robust to both upgrade and downgrade specifications.
However, the negative relation between political connections and recommendation
informativeness for politically connected firms (ζ3) is more robust for recommendation upgrades
than downgrades. It is possible that this analyst inefficiency is worse for recommendation
upgrades because upgrades are more likely to be associated with conflicts of interest due to
investment banking activities than are downgrades.
8.5.

Recommendation Initiations vs. Non-Initiations
McNichols and O’Brien (1997) find evidence of self-selection among analysts in that

analysts are more likely to provide coverage for firms about which they have favorable views.
They show that recommendation initiations are significantly more optimistic and have higher 1year-ahead return on equity than non-initiation recommendations. Therefore, I also examine
whether the relation between political connections and recommendation informativeness differs
when the analysts’ recommendation is an initiation or non-initiation.
In Table 10, I find that the negative relation between political connections and
recommendation informativeness (ρ1) holds in both recommendation initiation and non-initiation
scenarios. The negative relation between political connections and recommendation
informativeness for politically connected firms (ρ3) appears to be stronger for non-initiation
recommendations than initiations. This suggests that analyst experience alone with politically
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Table 9
The Effect of Stock Recommendation Upgrades versus Downgrades
RET = ζ 0 + ζ 1 POLITICAL + ζ 2 PMAFE + ζ 3 PMAFE*POLITICAL + ζ 4 FIRMEXP
+ ζ 5 BSIZE + ζ 6 N_FIRMS + ζ 7 REC_FREQ + ζ 8 LFR + ζ 9 N_ANALYSTS + ζ 10 REG + ε

Intercept
POLITICAL
PMAFE
PMAFE*POLITICAL
FIRMEXP
BSIZE
N_FIRMS
REC_FREQ
LFR
N_ANALYSTS
REG

Candidates
4.3393 ***
-0.8663 ***
0.4793 ***
-0.3778 **
-0.0686 ***
0.0088 ***
0.0029
-0.0182
0.0350 ***
-0.0592 ***
-0.7650 ***

Upgrades
Strength
Ability
4.2684 *** 4.6807 ***
-1.0715 *** -0.5104 ***
0.4657 *** 0.5051 ***
-0.3088 *
-0.3451 ***
-0.0677 *** -0.0710 ***
0.0089 *** 0.0089 ***
0.0031
0.0024
-0.0189
-0.0180
0.0351 *** 0.0349 ***
-0.0582 *** -0.0620 ***
-0.7546 *** -0.7918 ***

Adj. R2
n

1.09%
149,960

1.10%
149,960

1.08%
149,960

Power
Candidates
4.2723 *** 11.0048 ***
-0.9549 *** -1.4698 ***
0.4712 *** 0.3071 ***
-0.3523 **
-0.3105
-0.0683 *** -0.1412 ***
0.0089 *** 0.0048 ***
0.0031
-0.0064
-0.0181
-0.1316 ***
0.0351 *** 0.0817 ***
-0.0583 *** -0.1027 ***
-0.7588 *** -2.0101 ***
1.10%
149,960

3.41%
64,206

Downgrades
Strength
Ability
Power
10.8388 *** 11.9659 *** 10.8667 ***
-1.8089 *** -1.1504 *** -1.5159 ***
0.3109 *** 0.2749 *** 0.2986 ***
-0.4206 *
-0.0069
-0.2536 ***
-0.1396 *** -0.1415 *** -0.1417 ***
0.0048 *** 0.0047 *** 0.0048 ***
-0.0059
-0.0068
-0.0061 ***
-0.1323 *** -0.1350 *** -0.1313 ***
0.0815 *** 0.0817 *** 0.0816 ***
-0.1018 *** -0.1029 *** -0.1026 ***
-1.9945 *** -2.0403 *** -2.0122 ***
3.44%
64,206

3.40%
64,206

3.41%
64,206

*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by analyst.There are 214,166
observations estimated over 1993 - 2011.
Upgrades (downgrades) are recommendations that are higher (lower) than the previous recommendation for analyst i for firm j during year t . The 4
columns in this table use 4 different proxies for political connections (POLITICAL): Candidates, Strength, Ability, and Power. POLITICAL equals 1 if
politically connected, 0 otherwise. See Appendix A for variable definitions. RET is the market-adjusted return to recommendation k made by analyst i
for firm j . The buy-and-hold return is computed from the day before the recommendation date until the earlier of 30 days or 2 days before the
recommendation is revised or reiterated. For buy (hold and sell) recommendations, $1 is invested (shorted) in the recommended stock. POLITICAL is
the number of supported candidates by firm j in year t . PMAFE is the difference between the absolute forecast error for analyst i for firm j at time t
scaled by the mean absolute forecast error for firm j at time t . FIRMEXP is the number of years through year t for which analyst i supplied forecasts
for firm j . BSIZE is the logarithm of the number of analysts employed by the brokerage that analyst i works for during year t . N_FIRMS is the number
of firms for which analyst i issues annual forecasts during the year in which the recommendation is made. REC_FREQ is the number of
recommendations analyst i issues for firm j during year t . LFR, leader-follower ratio, is the cumulative number of days by which the preceding two
forecasts lead forecast k divided by the cumulative number of days by which the subsequent two forecasts follow forecast k . N_ANALYSTS is the
number of analysts who issue forecasts and recommendations for firm j during year t . REG equals 1 if firm is in financial services industry (one-digit
SIC code 6) or utilities industry (two-digit SIC code 49), and 0 otherwise.
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Table 10
The Effect of Stock Recommendation Initiations versus Non-Initiations
RET = ρ 0 + ρ 1 POLITICAL + ρ 2 PMAFE + ρ 3 PMAFE*POLITICAL + ρ 4 FIRMEXP
+ ρ 5 BSIZE + ρ 6 N_FIRMS + ρ 7 REC_FREQ + ρ 8 LFR + ρ 9 N_ANALYSTS + ρ 10 REG + ε

Intercept
POLITICAL
PMAFE
PMAFE*POLITICAL
FIRMEXP
BSIZE
N_FIRMS
REC_FREQ
LFR
N_ANALYSTS
REG
Adj. R2
n

Candidates
3.5924 ***
-0.9401 ***
0.2394 ***
-0.1183
0.0834 **
0.0095 ***
0.0044
-0.1476 **
0.0400 ***
-0.0178 ***
-0.5391 ***
0.82%
94,197

Initiations
Strength
Ability
3.5394 *** 3.8362 ***
-1.0571 *** -0.3661 **
0.2288 *** 0.2648 ***
0.0164
-0.2298 *
0.0859 **
0.0649
0.0095 *** 0.0095 ***
0.0046
0.0040
-0.1482 ** -0.1436 **
0.0400 *** 0.0398 ***
-0.0177 *** -0.0234 ***
-0.5333 *** -0.5730 ***
0.82%
94,197

1.06%
94,197

Power
Candidates
3.5338 *** 7.8029 ***
-1.0098 *** -1.0995 ***
0.2342 *** 0.4053 ***
-0.0621
-0.4831 ***
0.0865 **
-0.1062 ***
0.0095 *** 0.0053 ***
0.0046
-0.0027
-0.1482 **
-0.0477 ***
0.0400 *** 0.0602 ***
-0.0171 *** -0.1021 ***
-0.5342 *** -1.5807 ***
1.08%
94,197

2.23%
167,098

Non-Initiations
Strength
Ability
7.6602 *** 8.5272 ***
-1.3720 *** -0.8407 ***
0.3986 *** 0.4281 ***
-0.5013 *** -0.3384 ***
-0.1049 *** -0.1064 ***
0.0053 *** 0.0052 ***
-0.0025
-0.0029
-0.0484 *** -0.0503 ***
0.0602 *** 0.0602 ***
-0.1010 *** -0.1027 ***
-1.5690 *** -1.6060 ***

Power
7.6676 ***
-1.2217 ***
0.4005 ***
-0.4862 ***
-0.1058 ***
0.0053 ***
-0.0026
-0.0472 ***
0.0602 ***
-0.1011 ***
-1.5766 ***

2.36%
167,098

2.35%
167,098

2.32%
167,098

*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by analyst.There are 261,295
observations estimated over 1993 - 2011.
Initiations are defined as the first recommendation issued by analyst i in the I/B/E/S database. All other recommendations are defined as noninitiations. The 4 columns in this table use 4 different proxies for political connections (POLITICAL): Candidates, Strength, Ability, and Power.
POLITICAL equals 1 if politically connected, 0 otherwise. See Appendix A for variable definitions. RET is the market-adjusted return to
recommendation k made by analyst i for firm j . The buy-and-hold return is computed from the day before the recommendation date until the earlier of
30 days or 2 days before the recommendation is revised or reiterated. For buy (hold and sell) recommendations, $1 is invested (shorted) in the
recommended stock. POLITICAL is the number of supported candidates by firm j in year t . PMAFE is the difference between the absolute forecast
error for analyst i for firm j at time t scaled by the mean absolute forecast error for firm j at time t . FIRMEXP is the number of years through year t for
which analyst i supplied forecasts for firm j . BSIZE is the logarithm of the number of analysts employed by the brokerage that analyst i works for
during year t . N_FIRMS is the number of firms for which analyst i issues annual forecasts during the year in which the recommendation is made.
REC_FREQ is the number of recommendations analyst i issues for firm j during year t . LFR, leader-follower ratio, is the cumulative number of days by
which the preceding two forecasts lead forecast k divided by the cumulative number of days by which the subsequent two forecasts follow forecast
k . N_ANALYSTS is the number of analysts who issue forecasts and recommendations for firm j during year t . REG equals 1 if firm is in financial
services industry (one-digit SIC code 6) or utilities industry (two-digit SIC code 49), and 0 otherwise.

41

connected firms does not increase analyst efficiency in translating forecast accuracy into
informative recommendations since non-initiation recommendations appear to be driving the
negative association.
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9.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study examines how financial analysts use information on political connections in
their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. First, I analyze whether analysts’ stock
recommendations are more or less informative when the firms they cover have political
connections. Second, I investigate whether analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy is more or less
consistent with recommendation informativeness for politically connected firms.
I find strong evidence that analysts’ stock recommendations are significantly less
informative when the firms they follow have political connections. I find that the negative
relation between recommendation informativeness and political connections holds for both AllStar and non-All-Star analysts, upgrade and downgrade recommendations, as well as initiation
and non-initiation recommendations. I also show that analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy is less
consistent with stock recommendation informativeness for politically connected firms. However,
the negative relation between earnings forecast accuracy and recommendation informativeness
for politically connected firms appears to be driven by non-All-Star analysts, upgrade
recommendations, and non-initiation recommendations. This study informs the literature on
analyst forecasting by documenting how political connections influence the manner in which
analysts map their earnings forecasts into stock recommendations. I also show how analysts use
an important source of nonfinancial information, namely political connections, in their earnings
forecasts and stock recommendations. Furthermore, I contribute to the political connections
literature by showing that one channel through which political connections affect firm valuation
is through the earnings forecasts and stock recommendations of financial analysts.
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APPENDIX A
Variable Definitions
POLITICALCandidates
∑
Candidatesjt is equal to one if the firm has contributed to
candidate j in year t. POLITICALCandidates equals 1 if greater than
industry-year mean, and 0 otherwise.
POLITICALStrength
∑
Candidatesjt is equal to one if the firm has contributed to
candidate j in year t, and 0 otherwise. Ijt is equal to one if the
candidate is incumbent at time t, and 0 otherwise. NCVjt (NOVjt)
is the number of votes that candidate j’s party (opposing party)
holds in office at time t, and rellengthjt is the number of
continuous months of the firm-candidate relationship.
POLITICALStrength equals 1 if greater than industry-year mean,
and 0 otherwise.
POLITICALAbility
∑
HomeCandidatejt is equal to one if the firm has contributed to
candidate j in year t and the firm is headquartered in the same
state in which the candidate is running for office, and 0
otherwise. Ijt is equal to one if the candidate is incumbent at
time t, and 0 otherwise. NCVjt (NOVjt) is the number of votes
that candidate j’s party (opposing party) holds in office at time
t. POLITICALAbility equals 1 if greater than industry-year mean,
and 0 otherwise.
POLITICALPower
∑

[∑

]

Candidatesjt is equal to one if the firm has contributed to
candidate j in year t, and 0 otherwise. Ijt is equal to one if the
candidate is incumbent at time t, and 0 otherwise. NCVjt (NOVjt)
is the number of votes that candidate j’s party (opposing party)
holds in office at time t. Rankmt is the reciprocal of candidate j’s
rank on committee m (where rank =1 for the most important
member, rank = 2 for the next important member, etc.). Median
Rankmt is the median number of members on committee m.
POLITICALPower equals 1 if greater than industry-year mean,
and 0 otherwise.
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RET

The market-adjusted return to recommendation k made by
analyst i for firm j. The buy-and-hold return is computed from
the day before the recommendation date until the earlier of 30
days or 2 days before the recommendation is revised or
reiterated. For buy (hold and sell) recommendations, $1 is
invested (shorted) in the recommended stock.

PMAFE

The difference between the absolute forecast error for analyst i
for firm j at time t scaled by the mean absolute forecast error for
firm j at time t.
The number of years through year t for which analyst i supplied
forecasts for firm j.
The logarithm of the number of analysts employed by the
brokerage firm that analyst i works for during year t.
The number of firms for which analyst i issues annual forecasts
during the year in which the recommendation is made.
The number of recommendations analyst i issues for firm j
during year t.
The leader-follower ratio is the cumulative number of days by
which the preceding two forecasts lead forecast k divided by the
cumulative number of days by which the subsequent two
forecasts follow forecast k.
The number of analysts who issue forecasts and stock
recommendations for firm j during year t
Equals 1 if the firm operates in the financial services industry
(one-digit SIC code 6) or in the utilities industry (two-digit SIC
code 49), and 0 otherwise.
Equals 1 if the firm has a registered political action committee,
0 otherwise.
Natural log of price times shares outstanding (prcc_f * csho).
Natural log of sales.
Natural log of number of employees in millions (emp).
The number of business segments.
The number of geographic segments.
Book-to-market ratio is stockholders' book equity divided by
market value [ceq/(prcc_f*csho)]
The sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities,
divided by total assets [(dltt + dlc)/at].
Operating cash flow divided by total assets [(oancf - xidoc)/at].
Sales divided by total industry sales.
Herfindahl index of industry concentration computed with net
sales.
Number of firms in a firm's industry with an established
political action committee.

FIRMEXP
BSIZE
N_FIRMS
REC_FREQ
LFR

N_ANALYSTS
REG

ACTIVE
SIZE
SALES
EMPLOYEES
BUS_SEG
GEO_SEG
BM
LEV
CFO
MARKET_SHARE
HERF
INDUSTRY_ACTIVE
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APPENDIX B
First-Stage Probit Model of Firm's Decision to be Politically Active
ACTIVE = λ 0 + λ 1 SIZE + λ 2 SALES + λ 3 EMPLOYEES + λ 4 BUS_SEG + λ 5 GEO_SEG + λ 6 BM
+ λ 7 LEV + λ 8 CFO + λ 9 MARKET_SHARE + λ 10 HERF + λ 11 REG
+ λ 12 INDUSTRY_ACTIVE + ε
Coefficient
-6.9422 ***
0.1159 ***
0.4754 ***
0.1928 ***
0.0364 ***
-0.0726 ***
0.0000
0.0139 ***
0.2128 *
0.1269
2.1618 ***
0.4200 ***
0.0174 ***

Intercept
SIZE
SALES
EMPLOYEES
BUS_SEG
GEO_SEG
BM
LEV
CFO
MARKET_SHARE
HERF
REG
INDUSTRY_ACTIVE
R2

Std. Error
0.0982
0.0123
0.0200
0.0164
0.0068
0.0078
0.0000
0.0042
0.1113
0.3593
0.2482
0.0462
0.0012

p -value
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.9115
0.0008
0.0558
0.7240
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

36.34%

There are 92,375 firm-year observations estimated over 1993 - 2011. ACTIVE equals 1 if the firm has a registered
political action committee, 0 otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of price times shares outstanding (prcc_f *
csho). SALES is the natural logarithm of sales. EMPLOYEES is the natural logarithm of the number of employees in
millions (emp). BUS_SEG is the number of business segments. GEO_SEG is the number of geographic segments.
BM, book-to-market, is stockholders' book equity divided by market value [ceq/(prcc_f*csho)]. LEV is the sum of
long-term debt and debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets [(dltt + dlc)/at]. CFO is operating cash flow
divided by total assets [(oancf - xidoc)/at]. MARKET_SHARE is sales divided by total industry sales. HERF is the
Herfindahl index of industry concentration computed with net sales. REG equals 1 if the firm operates in the
financial services industry (one-digit SIC code 6) or in the utilities industry (two-digit SIC code 49), and 0 otherwise.
INDUSTRY_ACTIVE is the number of firms in a firm's industry with an established political action committee. All
continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent to mitigate outliers.
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